I Gave My Website an MCP Server. No AI Can Find It Yet.
I gave my personal site a Model Context Protocol server, content exposed as tools an agent can operate, not just text it can read. The build took an afternoon. The discovery problem is the whole industry's, and it isn't solved yet.
Perspective · June 2026
TL;DR
- ·I added an MCP (Model Context Protocol) server to this site so an AI agent can operate it, list articles, fetch a full piece, search, instead of just scraping the rendered text. For a public, read-only site this is genuinely self-service: no login, no OAuth, no keys.
- ·The catch is discovery. As of June 2026, no shipped standard lets an agent take a bare domain and figure out that it hosts an MCP server. The spec literally tells clients to "accept an MCP server URL from the user." Every client, ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, the open Llama stacks, needs a human to paste that URL. The endpoint is given, not discovered.
- ·And the gap is half deliberate. Blindly auto-connecting to a stranger's tools is unsafe by design, tool poisoning, line-jumping, rug pulls, the lethal trifecta. The future is being built (Server Cards, an official registry, agentic-web proposals), just more slowly and more cautiously than the hype implies.
What I Actually Built
This site has a section called Thinking, articles and product playbooks. A few months ago I did something that, on paper, sounds like a gimmick: I gave the site its own MCP server.
Model Context Protocol is the open standard Anthropic published in late 2024 and then handed to a foundation backed by basically everyone, AWS, Google, Microsoft, OpenAI, Anthropic, Cloudflare, Bloomberg, Block[20]. The one-line version everyone repeats is "USB-C for AI"[22]: a single, standard way to plug an AI model into external tools and data, so you stop building a custom integration for every model-times-every-tool combination.
Here's the distinction that matters. Without MCP, an AI that wants to use my site reads it the way Google does, it scrapes the rendered HTML and pattern-matches text. With MCP, the site stops being a page to read and becomes a set of tools to operate. My server exposes three: list_content (here's everything I've published), get_content (give me this specific piece in full), and search_content (find the pieces about X). An agent can call those directly and get clean, structured answers instead of guessing from a scraped DOM.
The part I want to be honest about: building it was almost anticlimactic. One library file wires the MCP endpoint to the three content sources the site already maintains, the article catalog, the playbook concepts, and the hand-written canonical text I keep for LLMs. No new database. No duplicate content to keep in sync. The MCP surface reads from the same single sources of truth the site renders from, so it can't drift. An afternoon, not a project.
So I had a live, public, open MCP server sitting at a stable URL. Then I went looking for the magic.
The Thing I Expected to Work, and Didn't
My mental model was the obvious one. I assumed that by 2026, the major assistants, ChatGPT, Gemini, Claude, the open Llama-based stacks, would do something like this: you mention a site, the AI checks whether it exposes an MCP server, and if it finds an open, read-only one, it just... uses it. The way a browser finds a site's favicon or a crawler finds robots.txt. Discovery should be automatic, and an open server should be self-service.
That is not how it works. Not on any mainstream client, today.
The current MCP specification (the stable revision is dated November 2025) is blunt about it. The transport section instructs the client to "accept an MCP server URL from the user"[1]. The endpoint is an input, not something the agent finds. There is no robots.txt for MCP, no ratified, well-known location an agent can check to learn "this domain has tools, here's where, here's what they do." The only /.well-known/ paths the spec defines are for OAuth, and they only kick in after you already know the endpoint[2].
So across every client, the pattern is identical and unavoidable: a human obtains the URL out of band → pastes or adds it → authenticates if needed → approves the tools. The endpoint is given, not discovered.
The State of Play, by Client (June 2026)
I checked each one, because "we're not there yet" is easy to assert and worth grounding:
- ChatGPT supports remote MCP servers, but behind Developer Mode, which OpenAI labels "elevated risk" and tells you is "intended for developers." You enable it, create an app, paste the server URL. Their own warning is striking: "do not connect to a custom MCP server unless you know and trust the underlying application", and even "trusting an MCP's developer does not make this safe"[9].
- Claude supports custom connectors (in beta): add connector, paste URL, authenticate[10]. There's also a reviewed directory, but that's a human-vetted allowlist, not domain discovery.
- Gemini's consumer app has no path for custom or remote MCP servers at all, only a fixed set of first-party connected apps (Gmail, Drive, and so on)[11]. The developer SDK and CLI can do MCP; the app most people actually use cannot.
- Open / self-hosted stacks (LibreChat, and Llama models wired through it) support remote MCP, via a config file or a setup panel[12]. Powerful, and still manual.
Nothing in that list crawls a website to find and connect to its MCP server. The invariant holds everywhere: obtain URL → add it → auth → approve.
Why We're Not There Yet, and Why Part of That Is on Purpose
The easy read is "the standard is just immature, give it a year." That's half true. The more interesting half is that the missing piece is being deliberately withheld, because blind auto-connect is unsafe in a way that isn't a bug you can patch.
On the standards side: discovery proposals have circulated since December 2024, a /.well-known/mcp.json file, "Server Cards," a "Universal MCP Manifest," DNS-based schemes. The live, official effort is the Server Card working group[5]. As of mid-June 2026 it's still a draft, and it's being moved off the core standards track into optional extensions[6]. The official registry that launched in preview in 2025 is, by its own documentation, "not intended to be directly consumed by host applications"[7], it's a catalog for aggregators to poll, and it verifies who owns a namespace, not that a live tool endpoint sits on an arbitrary marketing domain[8]. The plumbing is arriving; the doorbell isn't.
On the safety side, this is the part the hype skips. When an agent connects to an MCP server, the descriptions of the tools are visible to the model but not to you. That means a malicious server can hand instructions straight to your AI at the moment of connection, before you've approved a single action, security researchers named this "tool poisoning"[14] and "line-jumping"[13]. Trust isn't even durable: a server you approved can quietly change what its tools do afterward (a "rug pull"). Stack that on the "lethal trifecta"[16], give an agent access to your private data, expose it to untrusted content, and give it a way to send data out, and you have a data-exfiltration machine. There's a real CVE (9.6 severity) for remote code execution triggered just by connecting to an untrusted MCP server[17]. There's a documented attack where a poisoned GitHub MCP flow leaked a user's private repositories[15].
The root cause is unsolved as of mid-2026: an LLM can't reliably tell trusted instructions from untrusted content it's reading. Until that's better handled, "your AI auto-discovers and self-connects to any website's tools" isn't a convenience the industry is racing toward, it's a threat model the industry is consciously routing around[18]. The caution in OpenAI's and Anthropic's product gating isn't timidity. It's the correct response to the current security reality.
What Does Work Today
Here's the nuance that keeps this honest, and it's the good news for small sites. Strip the requirement down from "auto-discovered" to "self-service once you have the URL," and a public, read-only server clears the bar cleanly. Because MCP authorization is optional[2], my server has no login, no token, no OAuth dance. You paste the URL once into a client that supports remote MCP, and the agent can immediately list, fetch, and search my writing, structured, clean, no scraping. That genuinely works end to end, right now. The only missing step is the one the whole industry is missing: the agent can't find the door on its own. You still have to point at it.
What This Means If You Run a Site
Two things, one tactical and one strategic.
Tactical: if you publish anything you'd want an AI to represent accurately, and increasingly that's how people will first encounter your work, exposing a small, public, read-only MCP server is cheap insurance. It's an afternoon. It costs nothing to run if your content already lives in a structured source. And it future-proofs you for the discovery layer that is coming[4]: when Server Cards or a registry-driven flow finally ship, the sites that already speak MCP will be the ones agents can actually use.
Strategic: this is the same shift I keep coming back to. For twenty years the question was "is my site indexable by Google," can a crawler read me. The next question is "is my site operable by an agent," can an AI use me[21]. Those are different muscles. Indexability is about text and links. Operability is about exposing capability, tools with clean inputs and outputs, a reliable contract, a stable endpoint. The sites that win the agent era won't be the ones with the best-scraped prose. They'll be the ones that handed agents a set of tools and said: here, operate this.
I built that door for my own site. I'm convinced it's the right move. I just had to accept that, in June 2026, I'm the one who has to walk each agent over and point at the handle. The door is open. The bell isn't wired yet.
Sources & Further Reading
22 sources researched for this article. Last updated when the page was published.
Spec & protocol
- MCP Specification 2025-11-25 — Transports, Model Context Protocol, 2025-11-25Current stable spec: client must "accept an MCP server URL from the user" — the endpoint is an input, not discovered
- MCP Specification — Authorization (2025-06-18), Model Context Protocol, 2025-06-18Authorization is OPTIONAL; the only /.well-known/ paths defined are for OAuth, used after the endpoint is already known
- MCP Specification 2025-11-25 — Changelog, Model Context Protocol, 2025-11-25No MCP-endpoint discovery added; discovery items are OAuth-only (OIDC Discovery + RFC 9728 alignment)
- The 2026-07-28 MCP Specification Release Candidate, Model Context Protocol, 2026-05-21RC adds a discover method + routing headers + hardened .well-known auth — capability plumbing, not open-web "find any server"
Discovery & registry
- Server Card Working Group — Charter, Model Context Protocol, 2026-03-26The official discovery effort; chartered March 2026
- SEP-2127 MCP Server Card (PR #2127), Model Context Protocol, 2026-06-13Still draft, and being moved from the core Standards track to the optional Extensions track (PR #2893)
- Official MCP Registry (README), Model Context Protocol, 2025-10-24Preview Sept 2025, still pre-GA; explicitly "not intended to be directly consumed by host applications"
- MCP Registry — Authentication, Model Context Protocol, 2025-12Verifies namespace ownership (GitHub OIDC, DNS TXT) — not that a live tool endpoint sits on an arbitrary domain
Clients
- OpenAI — Developer Mode, OpenAI, 2026-06ChatGPT remote MCP behind "elevated risk" Developer Mode; "do not connect unless you know and trust the underlying application"
- Anthropic — Custom connectors via remote MCP, Anthropic, 2026-04-02Claude custom connectors (beta): add connector, paste URL, authenticate — manual
- Google — Gemini Connected Apps, Google, 2026-06Gemini consumer app has no custom/remote MCP path — only fixed first-party connected apps
- LibreChat — MCP support, LibreChat, 2026Open / self-hosted stacks (incl. Llama models) support remote MCP via config file or setup panel — manual
Security
- Jumping the Line: How MCP servers can attack you before you ever use them, Trail of Bits, 2025-04-21Malicious instructions arrive in tools/list and reach the model before any user approval ("line jumping")
- MCP Security Notification: Tool Poisoning Attacks, Invariant Labs, 2025-04-01Tool descriptions are model-visible but user-invisible; servers can poison the agent at connection time, and rug-pull tools post-approval
- GitHub MCP vulnerability — toxic-agent flow, Invariant Labs, 2025-05-26Documented attack leaking a user's private repositories — architectural, not patchable server-side
- The lethal trifecta, Simon Willison, 2025-06-16Private data + untrusted content + exfiltration path = data-exfil machine; auto-connecting to arbitrary sites maximizes the risk
- CVE-2025-6514 — mcp-remote RCE, NVD, 2025-07CVSS 9.6 remote code execution triggered just by connecting to an untrusted MCP server
- A Practical Guide for Securely Using Third-Party MCP Servers, OWASP GenAI, 2025-10-23Industry guidance treating third-party MCP connection as a deliberate, vetted action — not automatic
Ecosystem & forward-looking
- Remote Model Context Protocol servers, Cloudflare, 2025-03-25Turnkey remote MCP hosting (OAuth, McpAgent, Playground) — makes hosting easy, still URL-paste to connect
- The Agentic AI Foundation, Simon Willison, 2025-12-09MCP donated to the Linux Foundation with AWS, Anthropic, Google, Microsoft, OpenAI, Cloudflare, Bloomberg, Block as platinum members
- A Deep Dive Into MCP and the Future of AI Tooling, Andreessen Horowitz, 2025-03-20Called a registry + discovery protocol the next obvious build; advantage shifting to "best agent-discoverable tools"
- Why MCP Won, Latent Space, 2025-04-03Origin of the "USB-C for AI" framing — about the connector standard (the M×N problem), not discovery